The Supreme Court on Friday sided with a member of the mob that stormed the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, saying prosecutors exceeded their authority when they charged him using obstruction laws.
The ruling could have implications for hundreds of other prosecutions against the rioters, as well as some of the federal cases accusing former President Donald J. Trump of plotting to overturn the 2020 election. But it was not immediately clear how the court's decision will affect other cases.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing the majority opinion, narrowly interpreted the statute to apply only when a defendant's conduct compromised the integrity of physical evidence.
Lower courts will now apply this strict standard and will likely dismiss cases against many defendants.
The vote was 6-3, but it featured an unusual alliance: Liberal Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson voted for the majority, and conservative Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a dissenting opinion.
Most of the defendants in the Jan. 6 incident have not been charged under the law, which prosecutors apply only in the most serious cases, and those who have been indicted are facing other charges. For example, Joseph W. Fisher, a defendant in the case before the judge, is charged with six other counts.
It's also unclear whether a ruling in Fisher's favor would clear the two charges against Trump under the law. Jack Smith, the special counsel in charge of former President Trump's federal election interference case, has said Trump's conduct could be considered a crime even under a narrow interpretation of the law.
In any case, the former president faces two other charges unrelated to this law that are part of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
In a separate case, the Supreme Court is due to rule soon on whether Trump is immune from prosecution, a decision that could render moot the question of whether a 2002 law applies to his conduct.
The Supreme Court said the purpose of the law, which was enacted in the wake of accounting fraud and destruction of documents, was “to protect investors in public companies and restore confidence in financial markets following the collapse of Enron.”
The question before the judge in Fisher v. United States, No. 23-5572, was whether the law could be used to prosecute Fisher, a former Pennsylvania state trooper.
According to the government, Mr. Fisher sent text messages to his boss, the police chief of North Cornwall Township, Pennsylvania, about plans for January 6. “It might get violent,” he said in one message, and in another he wrote, “They should storm the Capitol, drag all the Democrats out into the streets and have a mob trial.”
Prosecutors say Fischer was seen on video yelling “Charge!” and pushing through the crowd to enter the Capitol at about 3:24 p.m. on January 6. He used vulgar language to taunt officers and shoved into a line of officers, prosecutors said. He was “forcibly removed approximately four minutes after entering,” according to the government's brief.
Fisher's legal team argued that while he was at the rally on the Ellipse, he was not involved in the original attack.
“Mr. Fischer was in Maryland, not Washington, D.C., when the mob stormed the Capitol,” his lawyers wrote in the filing. “He returned after Congress adjourned.”
“His previous Facebook posts about violence, when read out of context, indicate his belief that Antifa was planning to disrupt the rally,” they continued. He “clearly yelled 'Charge!' in jest, they added.
Prosecutors said Mr. Fisher, who disrupted the certification of Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s election victory, disrupted an official proceeding, violating a 2002 law that primarily provides for the suppression of evidence.
Indeed, at least in part, what the Act sought to accomplish was to fill a gap in federal criminal law: it was a crime to persuade others to destroy records relevant to an investigation or official proceeding, but not to destroy them yourself.
The Act consists of two sections. The first section makes it a criminal offence to fraudulently tamper with, destroy or conceal evidence in order to obstruct an official proceeding. The second section at issue in Fisher's case makes it a “miscellaneous” offence to fraudulently obstruct, influence or impede an official proceeding.
The crux of the case lies in the shift from the first part to the second. Prosecutors said the ordinary meaning of “otherwise” is “otherwise” — that is, they said, obstruction of an official proceeding does not require the destruction of evidence. The second part, they say, is broad and catch-all.
Fisher's lawyers countered that the first part must explain and qualify the second — that is, the obstruction of an official proceeding must be related to the destruction of evidence — and they would interpret “otherwise” as “as well.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, with Judge Florence Y. Pan writing that “any conflict between Congress's primary purpose in amending the statute and the broad language it chooses to include must be resolved in favor of the plain meaning of the provision.”
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gregory G. Katsas wrote that the latter part of the provision “applies only to conduct that affects the integrity or availability of evidence.”
He wrote that the government's interpretation “will encompass advocacy, lobbying and protest – common ways in which citizens attempt to influence official proceedings.”